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THE UNSTATED TENSION IN ALBUQUERQUE RAPE
CRISIS CENTER v. BLACKMER: A DIVERGENCE
BETWEEN FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM
SIMONA MARTINEZ-MCCONNELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of separation of powers provides the cardinal framework for federal
and state governments in the United States, the importance of which is illustrated in
the Constitution' and, specific to New Mexico, the New Mexico Constitution.2 In
accordance with the tenets embodied by separation of powers principles, our
government is divided into three independent and co-equal branches of government
in an effort to prevent the undue concentration of power in one branch.' Although
seemingly straightforward, separation of powers analysis often proves problematic
because the traditional methods of interpreting the doctrine-formalism and
functionalism-are dichotomous.4
Formalism posits that each branch of government should exercise only the power
it constitutionally is authorized to exercise; as a result, the inquiry is limited to the
text, origin, and structure of the constitution.5 Functionalism, on the other hand,
advocates a more pragmatic approach and allows the branches to overlap and blend
as long as the autonomy and integrity of one branch is not encroached upon by
another branch.6 New Mexico case law has historically vacillated between an
application of functionalism and formalism, which is evinced by the New Mexico
Supreme Court's decision in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer.7 The
discord between the majority and dissent in Blackmer exemplifies the tensions
underlying the competing theoretical approaches to separation of powers issues
The underlying issue in Blackmer was whether an alleged rape victim could assert
a statutory testimonial privilege9 and thus preclude the defendant from access to
communications she had with the Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center.' ° The issue
compelled the court in Blackmer to determine whether the New Mexico Legislature
had the constitutional authority to enact a rule affecting court practice and
* I would like to thank Professor Charles Daniels who provided me with the case upon which to base my
Note; my student article editors, Denise Chanez and Mark Barron, and my professors, Norman C. Bay, Stephen K.
Homer, and Michael B. Browde, for their insight and tireless editing; Channah Farber for her constant support; my
sister, Miquela McConnell, for her patience and confidence in me; my parents, Michael and Cynthia McConnell,
for all of their assistance with my academic career; and foremost my husband, Richard Cole, whose encouragement,
kindness, and infinite support made it possible for me to achieve publication.
1. U.S. CONST. arts. I-ill.
2. N.M. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 483, 882 P.2d 511,524 (1994).
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Panel I: Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 21 (1998).
5. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1523-24
(1991).
6. See Matthew James Tanielian, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine,
Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 967 (1995).
7. 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820.
8. Id.
9. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-25-1 to -6 (2006).
10. 2005-NMSC-032, 2, 120 P.3d at 821.
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procedure." The majority applied a functional framework by practically interpreting
case law, employing policy arguments, and deferring to legislative action to uphold
the validity of the testimonial privilege. At the same time, the majority asserted
judicial supremacy over rules of court practice and procedure. 12 Conversely, the
dissent adhered to a formalistic rationale and held the statutory privilege to be
unconstitutional; the dissent relied on the New Mexico Constitution, case law, and
court rule to hold that the constitutional authority to promulgate a rule of practice
and procedure is vested exclusively in the supreme court.1 3
This Note examines how New Mexico courts have employed both formalism and
functionalism to define the scope of the supreme court's authority to promulgate rules
of practice and procedure.14 Part II, which ultimately discusses where the power to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure originated, is divided into three sections,
the first of which presents an overview of the separation of powers doctrine. The
second section illustrates the tension between formalism and functionalism both on a
federal and state level. The third section of Part 11 demonstrates how the New Mexico
Supreme Court acquired the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure and
how New Mexico courts have vacillated between an application of formalism and
functionalism to define the scope of that power. Part 11 provides a brief summary of
Blackmer and illustrates how a district court discovery dispute found its way to the
New Mexico Supreme Court. Part IV then analyzes the rationale of the two opinions
filed in Blackmer, illustrating why the majority's functional approach supports the
constitutionality of the statutory privilege whereas the dissent's formal analysis leads
to the opposite conclusion. Part V reviews the approach of each and posits that the
majority and dissent could have better served New Mexico law by consolidating parts
of their arguments, thereby melding functionalism and formalism. The result of such
an amalgamation could have provided for a bright-line rule defining when the
legislature may enact rules of practice and procedure and instituted a degree of
pragmatism between the two branches in fulfilling their constitutionally prescribed
roles.
II. POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Separation of Powers
In order to understand the different rationales employed in Albuquerque Rape
Crisis Center v. Blackmer to evaluate the constitutionality of the victim-counselor
privilege enumerated in the Confidentiality Act, it is important to appreciate the
basic premise of separation of powers. The separation of powers doctrine provided
the framework for the majority and dissent opinions with regard to whether the New
II. 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820.
12. Id. 5-17, 120 P.3d at 821-26.
13. Id. 23-35, 120 P.3d at 827-29 (emphasis added).
14. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976) (applying predominately
a formalistic rationale); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975) (applying, arguably,
a combination of formalism and functionalism where the court asserted that the power to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure is vested exclusively in New Mexico but did not object to a procedural statute that proved
reasonable and workable); State v. Roy; 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936) (applying primarily a functional
approach); infra Part IR.
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Mexico Legislature may enact rules regulating the practice and procedure of the
courts, specifically an evidentiary privilege. 15 It is well settled in New Mexico that
the separation of powers doctrine originated on the federal level and is based on the
Founding Fathers' fear that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary," in one governmental body would result in tyranny. 16
Separation of powers, therefore, "is expressed implicitly in the United States
Constitution["] and explicitly in.. .the New Mexico Constitution."' 8 Both
constitutions articulate a tripartite framework in which separate powers lie in the
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.'9 This tripartite structure creates a
system of checks and balances among the three branches so that each branch may
balance the power of the other to "safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."20
Judicial and Legislative Power
The essence of judicial power in New Mexico, as well as on the federal level,2
can be found in the judiciary's "final authority to render and enforce a judgment."22
The power, therefore, is one of review.23 In addition, the judiciary may exercise
inherent authority that it deems "'essential to the court's fulfilling of its judicial
functions.' ,,
24
The scope of the judiciary's inherent authority varies because the New Mexico
Supreme Court infers this authority from article I, section 3 and article VI, section
1 of the New Mexico Constitution.25 Article I, section 3 articulates the delineation
of powers among the three branches and article VI, section 1 mandates that the
supreme court "shall have a superintending control over all inferior courts. 26 The
New Mexico Supreme Court has affirmed that its inherent authority "extends to all
15. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820; see also Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S.
Montgomery, Jurisdiction as May Be Provided by Law: Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36
N.M. L. REv. 215 (2006). The Montgomery article provides an analysis of appellate jurisdiction in New Mexico and
argues that the power to control its appellate jurisdiction is vested in the legislature as articulated in the New Mexico
Constitution. The article illustrates separation of powers tensions between the legislature and the judiciary with
regard to appellate jurisdiction because the judiciary currently asserts appellate authority, although this power
historically has been exercised by the legislature. Although the Montgomery article illustrates different issues than
the ones presented in this Note, it provides an interesting examination into the history between the legislature and
the judiciary in New Mexico and the underlying tensions regarding the constitutional powers of each branch.
16. Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 483, 882 P.2d 511, 524 (1994) (citing THE FEDERALIST No.47
(James Madison)).
17. U.S. CONST. arts. I-Ill (delineating the powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches).
18. Harrell, 118 N.M. at 483, 882 P.2d at 524. "The powers of the government of this state are divided into
three distinct departments...and no person...charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. arts. I-ill.
20. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 273 (199 1).
21. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 591 (1918).
22. Harrell, 118 N.M. at 484, 882 P.2d at 525.
23. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 253.
24. State v. Gonzales, 2002-NMCA-071, 21, 49 P.3d 681,685 (quoting In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058,
27, 30 P.3d 376, 382).
25. N.M. CONST. arts. l1I, § 1, VI, § 3.
26. Id.
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conduct before the court" in order to function effectively and expeditiously.27 The
inherent authority doctrine is a means employed by the judiciary to maintain its
independence and integrity as a branch of government.28 While necessary to the
operation of the judiciary, the inherent authority doctrine has been subject to
criticism, primarily when the court exercises this authority as a means to enhance
its own power.29
The essence of legislative authority, on the other hand, is deemed to be the
making of substantive law. 30 The legislature, as the "'voice of the people,"' creates
and promotes public policy, thus responding to the contemporary needs of an
evolving society. 3' Like its counterpart, the legislature exercises inherent authority
that it deems necessary to perform its constitutional functions.32
Tensions regarding separation of powers issues between the legislature and the
judiciary arise when the authority of one is perceived to be threatened by an act of
the other.33 When such issues arise, the constitutionality of a judicial or legislative
act is held to be measured "solely by the yardstick of the constitution., 34 This
premise is often difficult to apply because the constitution does not necessarily grant
power to either branch but instead is a "limitation[] on the power of each., 35 Ambiguity
arises with respect to whether the constitution vests a certain power within the
judiciary or the legislature because the answer is often determined purely by
inference.36 That ambiguity is only reinforced when the judiciary and the legislature
share that power.
B. Tension between Functionalism and Formalism
The doctrine of separation of powers has caused a breadth of litigation and legal
debate on both the federal37 and state38 levels.39 The difficulty arises in how to
interpret separation of powers as a theory-that is, may it be construed broadly to
allow the branches to function interdependently with one another in an effort to
27. State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 8-9, 896 P.2d 1148, 1155
(1995).
28. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 255-56 (noting that the court will assert a power to be
inherent in the judiciary if it views that power necessary to the court's "essential role").
29. Id. at 236 (citing Michael B. Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and Judicial Rule
Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Restraint, 15 N.M. L. REv. 407 (1985)).
30. Adjustments v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2000-NMSC-035, 19, 14 P.3d 525,531 (citing Sandel
v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-019, 1 28, 980 P.2d 55, 64).
31. State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 2003-NMSC-017, 36,73 P.2d 768, 774 (Serna, J., specially concurring)
(quoting Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995)).
32. See Dugger v. City of Santa Fe, 114 N.M. 47, 51, 834 P.2d 424, 428 (1992).
33. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 252-53.
34. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 252, 316 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1957),
overruled on other grounds by Wylie v. Mowrer, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381 (1986).
35. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 254-55.
36. Id. at 255.
37. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 425
U.S. 946 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820; State v. Smith,
2004-NMSC-032, 98 P.3d 1022; State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 961 P.2d 768; State v. Helman,
117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (1994); Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470,882 P.2d 511 (1994); State v. Arnold,
51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
39. See Tanielian, supra note 6, at 969-70.
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accommodate the needs of an evolving government, or should it be construed more
narrowly, whereby each branch is permitted to exercise only those powers
authorized by the constitution?"0 These two approaches to separation of powers may
be defined as functionalism and formalism, respectively, and are considered "[tihe
most prominent theories of constitutional interpretation" because each serves as a
useful tool for the court to employ when grappling with such issues.4' The struggle
between these two approaches to separation of powers issues has proved
contentious, as evidenced in the U.S. Supreme Court' S42 and New Mexico Supreme
Court' S43 inconsistent reliance on both doctrines.' As a result, both courts may be
seen as either forcing the case, "often artificially, into terms that bring it within the
express language of one of the specific [constitutional] provisions, or... supplying
some ad hoc general principle of its own."4
1. Functional Approach
A functional inquiry asks whether the act of one branch encroaches on the
essential functions or aggrandizes its power at the expense of another branch.46
Functionalism focuses, therefore, on the fundamental balance of power in the
tripartite system and whether the exercise of power by one branch threatens to
disrupt that balance.47 As a result, functionalism encourages each branch to be both
independent from and interdependent on the other branches as a means to promote
autonomy and reciprocity. 48 Courts that employ a functional approach review
separation of powers issues pragmatically by exercising balancing tests and flexible
standards to promote political efficacy, adaptability, and justice in the law.49
Functionalism, as a result, provides for greater judicial deference to legislative and
executive action because it encourages the court to respect each branch's right to
balance and check the power of the others.'
New Mexico courts have relied, at times, on the U.S. Supreme Court's functional
interpretation of separation of powers to provide a framework when addressing these
issues.5' The Supreme Court's analysis in Mistretta v. United StatesY2 provides an
example of this more pragmatic approach and illustrates how New Mexico courts
40. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 21; see also Tanielian, supra note 6, at 966-67.
41. Brown, supra note 5, at 1522.
42. See supra note 37.
43. See supra note 38.
44. Tanielian, supra note 6, at 971.
45. Brown, supra note 5, at 1522.
46. Id. at 1527.
47. Peter L. Strauss, Bowsher v. Synar: Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency? 72 CoRNELL L REv. 488, 502 (1987).
48. Brown, supra note 5, at 1528.
49. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 21-22.
50. Tanielian, supra note 6, at 967 (stating that "[t]he goal of the separation of powers should be to ensure
that each branch retains enough power to continue to act as a check upon the power of the other branches").
51. Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470,483, 882 P.2d 511, 524 (1994) (asserting that "[tihe constitution
by no means contemplates total separation of each of these three essential branches of Government" and that the
Federal Constitution provides some degree of overlap between the three branches (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 121 (1976))).
52. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Scalia was the lone dissenter in this case, which is not surprising given his loyalty
to formalism. See id. at 413.
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have employed similar reasoning when faced with analogous separation of powers
inquiries. In Mistretta, the petitioner argued that the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984"4 (SRA) violated separation of powers because its composition was perceived
to meld judicial and executive characteristics into the legislative Sentencing
Commission.55 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument and held that by passing
the SRA, Congress "neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the
constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate branches. 56
Stressing that "our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of
overlapping responsibility, [and] a duty of interdependence as well as
independence," the Court in Mistretta held that the provisions of the SRA did not
aggrandize the power of one branch to the detriment of another branch.57 The Court
stressed the need for reciprocity between the three branches of government and
found that the SRA performed such a function by enabling Congress to address the
pressing issue of sentencing reform by permitting the judiciary to aid in the
endeavor.58
The Supreme Court in Mistretta based its analysis on a flexible interpretation of
separation of powers.59 While acknowledging that each branch must remain separate
from the other, the Court asserted that some intermingling between the branches is
necessary to respond to a complex and evolving society.' Although the SRA
enabled the legislative, judicial, and executive branches to commingle, this fusion
neither disrupted the balance of power between the three entities nor compromised
the integrity of either branch and, therefore, was constitutional.6 t
2. Formal Approach
Formalism, unlike its counterpart, is premised on the theory that the government
has three distinct branches, each of which must be "'entirely free from the control
53. See, e.g., Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d 511.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000).
55. 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted to address sentencing reform
in federal courts. The Act created the U.S. Sentencing Commission as a means to carry out this legislation. The
Commission was responsible for promulgating sentencing guidelines for the federal courts. Id. at 367-69. The
Petitioner challenged the "constitutionally of the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission." Id. at 362. The Court considered four issues with respect to the petitioner's claim: first,
whether the delegation of power by Congress to the Judiciary to promulgate such guidelines offended the separation
of powers under the nondelegation doctrine; second, whether the Act itself violated separation of powers; third,
whether the location and member structure of the Commission offended separation of powers; and fourth, whether
the power of Presidential appointment and removal to the Commission "prevent[ed] the Judicial Branch from
performing its constitutionally assigned functions." Id. at 362-408.
56. Id. at 384. "Although the unique composition and responsibilities of the Sentencing Commission give
rise to serious concerns about a disruption of the appropriate balance of governmental power among the coordinate
Branches, we conclude.. .that petitioner's fears for the fundamental structural protections of the Constitution
prove.. to be 'more smoke than fire'...." Id.
57. Id. at 380-97.
58. See id. at 407-08.
59. Id. at 372.
60. See id. (stating that "our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power").
61. Id. at 393.
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or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others... 6 2 Formalism
focuses on the text, structure, and origin of the Constitution in order to promote a
clear substantive divide between the three branches.63 As a result, the court looks to
which branch is acting, what power the branch is exercising, and whether the branch
has the constitutional authority to do so.64 This inquiry leads to the application of
bright-line rules that, in theory, promote transparency, predictability, and continuity
in the law.65
Like functionalism, formalism has influenced the New Mexico Supreme Court's
separation of powers jurisprudence. 66 The court has employed the same formalistic
principles articulated in U.S. Supreme Court opinions to assert that "each branch of
government maintains its independent and distinct function," stressing that the
power of one branch may not be exercised by the other.67
The U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Bowsher v. Synar illustrates such a
formalistic approach. 68 The Court in Bowsher held the Balanced Budget and Emerg-
ency Deficit and Control Act of 1985 to be unconstitutional because it authorized
the Comptroller General, an agent of the legislature,69 to make budget cuts and
therefore to execute the law, a power exclusively reserved to the executive branch.7 °
The Court emphasized that the Constitution divides our government into three
defined categories in order to prevent tyranny.7' In addition, the division of powers
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branch serves to check and balance
the power among the three branches.72 Consequently, a power properly exercised by
one branch could not, at the same time, be exercised by the other.73 The provisions
of this Act were unconstitutional because the legislation attempted to weave the
legislative and executive branches into the same fabric.74 In the Court's view, the
"'fundamental necessity of maintaining the three general departments of government
entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of the
others"' 75 overrode any need for malleability or practicality in the law.76
62. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986)).
63. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 21-22; see Brown, supra note 5, at 1525 (noting that formalists "posit that
the structural provisions of the Constitution should be understood solely by their literal language and the drafters'
original intent regarding their application").
64. See Strauss, supra note 47, at 5 10.
65. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 21-22.
66. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 19-22, 961 P.2d 768, 774.
67. Id. 1 21, 961 P.2d at 774.
68. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
69. Id. at 720 (stating that the Comptroller General is "removable not by the President but only by a joint
resolution of Congress or by impeachment").
70. Id. at 736.
71. Id. at721.
72. Id.
73. Id. ("'[T]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person.' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison))).
74. Id. at 726.
75. Id. at 725 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935)).
76. See Strauss, supra note 47, at 489.
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3. Eclectic Approach
Not wedded exclusively to either rationale, the U.S. Supreme Court77 and the
New Mexico Supreme Court have incorporated both approaches to separation of
powers inquiries. 78 This "eclectic ' 79 approach was first employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland8° where Chief Justice Marshall "wove
both formalist and functional lines of thinking and argumentation" to adopt a
"constitutional policy of expansive national power."'" New Mexico judges have
demonstrated a similar willingness to blend formalism and functionalism in order
to draw on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each approach. 2 The
application of this "eclectic" approach draws "methodologically on rules and
standards, as well as on the doctrinal supports of categorical separation and checks
and balances. 83 Ultimately, the tendency for both federal and state courts to
fluctuate between formalism and functionalism demonstrates that neither has
determined definitively the appropriate methodology to employ when analyzing
separation of powers issues.8'
C. Rules of Practice and Procedure in New Mexico
New Mexico courts have demonstrated a hesitancy to adhere to either formalism
or functionalism when faced with the issue of whether the legislature may share the
authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure with the New Mexico
Supreme Court.85 Originally, the New Mexico Legislature had the power to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure. 86 The legislature, however, took a
functional approach to the exercise of this power and shared it with the New Mexico
77. Tanielian, supra note 6, at 971-72.
78. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 961 P.2d 768. The court stated that "each branch
of government maintains its independent and distinct function[s]" and noted that "absolute separation of powers
is neither desirable nor realistic [as] the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers permits some overlap of
governmental functions." Id. 7 21, 23, 961 P.2d at 774-75 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see
also State v. Gonzales, 2002-NMCA-071, 49 P.3d 681 (employing both formalist and functionalist arguments in
upholding the judiciary's discretion to dismiss criminal prosecutions).
79. Tanielian, supra note 6, at 996.
80. 17 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
81. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 22.
82. See infra Part I.C; see also Tanielian, supra note 6, at 996.
83. Tanielian, supra note 6, at 996 (stating that this eclectic approach "parallels the Framers' decision to
blend the political theories of separated powers and checks and balances").
84. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986) ("The fundamental necessity of maintaining each
of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control of coercive influence, direct or
indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question."), with Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) (noting that the Court "looked to a number of factors
in evaluating the extent to which the congressional scheme endangers separation of powers principles").
85. Compare State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936) (applying primarily a functional approach to
uphold the supreme court's authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure), with State ex rel. Anaya v.
McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 529 P.2d 1006 (1975) (applying a combination of formalism and functionalism when the
court asserted that the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure is vested exclusively in the supreme
court but that the court did not object to a procedural statute that proved reasonable and workable). See also
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976) (applying a predominately formalistic
approach to hold that the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure is vested exclusively in the supreme
court).
86. Michael B. Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and Judicial Rule-Making Power in New
Mexico: The Need for Prudential Restraints, 15 N.M. L. REv. 407, 411-12 (1985); see also Montgomery &
Montgomery, supra note 15, at 224.
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Supreme Court. Pursuant to the original understanding of both the New Mexico
Legislature and Supreme Court, if a conflict arose, with respect to rule making, the
legislature would prevail. 8 In 1933, however, the New Mexico Legislature
expressly conferred rule-making power on the supreme court. 89 The 1933 Act
empowered the supreme court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure.9° Pursuant to this power, the supreme court held all existing procedural
statutes to be rules of the court and made substantial changes to the pre-existing
statutes. 9' Shortly after the 1933 Act transferred rule-making authority from the
legislature to the supreme court, there was a constitutional challenge to the statute
in State v. Roy.92
State v. Roy was the first case in New Mexico to challenge the judiciary's
authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.93 The court in Roy
addressed three separation of powers issues. First, the court considered whether the
1933 Act was an unconstitutional delegation of power from the legislature to the
judiciary.9' Second, assuming the Act was constitutional, the court analyzed whether
this power was vested exclusively in the judiciary.95 Third, the court questioned
whether it had superintending power over inferior courts to regulate rules affecting
practice and procedure.96
The court in Roy held that the 1933 Act did not violate article III, section 1 of the
New Mexico Constitution because it was not an unconstitutional delegation of
power from the legislature to the judiciary.97 The court advocated a functionalist
argument, stating that the authority to form rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure is not necessarily a legislative function.98 Consequently, the 1933 Act did
not result in the judiciary invading the province of the legislature.99
87. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 412, 444 (stating that the legislature delegated a portion "of
what it perceived to be... legislative power to the supreme court"). For a full historical analysis of the shared
responsibility between the legislature and judiciary to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, see generally id.
See also Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15.
88. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 412,416-18 (stating that "the legislature was the dominant force
in rule-making in territorial New Mexico"). For example, the Act of 1887 enabled the supreme court to prescribe
rules regulating the practice in the supreme and district courts of the territory while stipulating that "such rules shall
not conflict with any of the laws of the United States or of the Territory of New Mexico." Id. at 416. While the
legislature allowed the judiciary to share in this authority, the legislature had superintending control. Id.
89. Id. at 426; see Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84,1933 N.M. Laws 147; see also Montgomery& Montgomery,
supra note 15, at 226.
90. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 426 (stating that this also included the authority to pass rules
that served to overrule procedural statutes).
91. Id.
92. Id.; see State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
93. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646.
94. Id. at 416, 60 P.2d at 658.
95. Id. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660.
96. Id. at 416-22, 60 P.2d at 658-62.
97. Id. at 416-20, 60 P.2d at 658-60.
98. Id. at 419, 60 P.2d at 660 ("[A]ssuming the right of the Legislature to make rules for the court, it does
not follow that thus action is a legislative function... .Not all acts performed by a Legislature are strictly legislative
in character." (internal quotations omitted)).
99. Id. at 419, 60 P.2d at 659.
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To support this pragmatic supposition, the court in Roy cited to the policies and
standards of other jurisdictions."° The court relied, in part, on State ex rel.
Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, which held that:
there never was and never can be such a thing in the practical administration of
the law as a complete, absolute, scientific separation of the so-called co-ordinate
governmental powers.., they are and always have been overlapping. Courts make
rules of procedure which in many instances at least might be prescribed by the
legislature."l '
In addition, the court in Roy cited to Chief Justice Marshall, who noted that the
legislature may confer certain powers on the judiciary without violating separation
of powers.'0 2 The court inferred from case law that, while the legislature may
prescribe rules of practice and procedure, such authority is not quintessentially
legislative in nature.'03
The court in Roy determined that, by enacting the 1933 Act, the legislature simply
chose to abdicate itself from the rule-making field and therefore allowed the
judiciary to take full control.'O The court further buttressed its argument by noting
that the New Mexico Territorial Legislature "recognized in the Supreme Court the
power to make rules for itself and the district court."'05 Accordingly, there was
historical support for the proposition that the supreme court and legislature
legitimately could share the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure."
Roy concluded that the 1933 Act was not a violation of article III, section 107 of the
New Mexico Constitution because the legislature did not confer a function
exclusively legislative on the judiciary.' °8 In addition, the court in Roy determined
the authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure to be integral to the
court's ability to function effectively and efficiently. Thus, it was a power inherent
and essential to the judiciary as an independent branch of government. "
The New Mexico Attorney General requested that the court in Roy take its
holding one step further and declare this power to be an "exclusive right... over
which the legislature has no control."" 0 The court declined to answer this formalistic
100. See Roy, 40 N.M. at 418-20, 60 P.2d at 659-60.
101. 220 N.W. 929, 938 (Wis. 1928).
102. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) ("The Courts...may make rules [but] [i]t will
not be contended, that these things might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the Courts; yet
it is not alleged that the power may not be conferred on the judicial department.").
103. Roy, 40 N.M. at 418, 60 P.2d at 660.
104. Id. at419, 60 P.2d at 660.
105. Id. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660 (citing numerous statutes).
106. Id. at 419-20, 60 P.2d at 660.
107. N.M. CONST. art. Ill, § 1. "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments.. and no person... charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments,
shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise
expressly.. permitted." Id.
108. Roy, 40 N.M. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660.
109. Id. Compare id. with Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 227. Montgomery criticized the
holding in Roy on the grounds that the court's decision to hold "that practice and procedure are creatures of court
rule.. was bound to collide" with preexisting case law, primarily with respect to appeals as they were traditionally
"creatures of statute." Id.
110. Roy, 40 N.M. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660. See also Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 230-31.
The New Mexico Attorney General's assertion that the power be vested exclusively in the judiciary proved to be
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contention. Instead, Roy asserted that the question of judicial exclusivity, with
respect to rules of practice and procedure, would not be determined until there was
a direct conflict between a rule of the court and a statute."'
Roy reviewed whether the court could provide rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure for the lower courts. 1 2 The court, relying on article VI, section 3, of the
New Mexico Constitution," 3 answered the issue in the affirmative." 4 The court
reasoned that the supreme court's superintending control over lower courts
empowered the supreme court to issue rules of practice and procedure in order to
ensure the unity of the judicial body in New Mexico." 5
The court in Roy articulated primarily a functionalist rationale to hold that the
supreme court has the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.1 6 The
court deduced from federal and state case law, New Mexico territorial history, and
its own practical experience that this authority was not necessarily legislative, was
shared at times between the legislature and the supreme court, and that the
legislature legitimately conferred it to the supreme court." 7 Stressing the notion that
each branch may commingle with the other without violating article I, section 3, of
the New Mexico Constitution or the basic premise of separation of powers, the court
validated its own power to promulgate rules affecting practice and procedure.
1 8
In Roy, the court noted that the issue touched on underlying values implicit in the
separation of powers doctrine when it acknowledged that the authority to enact rules
of practice and procedure is an inherent power of the judiciary." 9 Roy, relying on
article VI, section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution, stressed that judicial efficacy
and integrity depends on the supreme court's ability to regulate practice and
procedure in New Mexico courts. 20 This authority allows for the supreme court to
create a consistent and coherent body of rules to ensure that the judiciary functions
capably as a separate and independent branch of government.' 2' The court in Roy
reasoned that to preclude the supreme court from managing how it and the lower
courts functioned would diminish the independence and viability of the New Mexico
prescient of an argument Justice Carmody would later issue in 1964 regarding court reform. Id. Justice Carmody
argued for greater judicial control over practice and procedure, namely appellate jurisdiction because the "'Judicial
Branch should operate as one separate unit."' Id. (quoting Letter from Justice David W. Carmody to Edward E.
Triviz, Chairman of the Const. Revision Comm'n, and Ellis L. Stout, Vice-Chairman of the Const. Revision
Comm'n 1 (July 24, 1964) (on file with the New Mexico State Archives)).
11l. Roy, 40 N.M. at 420, 60 P.2d at 460.
112. Id. This only addressed control over district courts as, at this time, there were no appellate courts.
Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 217.
113. N.M. CONST. art. VL § 3 (recognizing that the supreme court has superintending control over inferior
courts).
114. Roy, 40 N.M. at 420, 60 P.2d at 661.
115. See id. at 421, 60 P.2d at 661.
116. See id. at 418, 60 P.2d at 659.
117. See id. at 418-23, 60 P.2d 659-62.
118. Id. at 422, 60 P.2d at 662.
119. Id. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660; see Sw. Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107,452 P.2d 176 (1969).
120. See Roy, 40 N.M. at 423, 60 P.2d at 662 ("It is at once manifest that such a power should be placed, and
was placed, with the reviewing court, since we are always charged with the duty of determining whether the rulings
of the trial court have been such as to operate to the disadvantage of the litigants.").
121. See id. at 421, 60 P.2d at 661; see also Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032,
135, 120 P.2d 820, 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
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judiciary. 122 By stressing that such power was inherent to the judiciary, the court in
Roy recognized the fundamental separation of powers concerns at stake but deemed
it unnecessary to vest this power exclusively in the judiciary in order to preserve
it. 123
When faced with similar challenges, New Mexico courts continued to assert that
the supreme court possessed the inherent power to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure.' 24 Contention arose, however, when the court was confronted with the
question Roy neglected to answer: whether the source of this authority was vested
exclusively in the judiciary. 125 That is, whether the functionalist rationale drawn in
Roy should evolve into a more formal conclusion to prevent the legislature from
sharing the authority with the judiciary. 126 Thus, with regard to the promulgation of
practice and procedure, courts had to determine whether judicial supremacy or
judicial exclusivity properly maintained the integrity and independence of the
judicial branch. 127
At least two cases directly challenged the functionalist approach articulated in
Roy; in State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride 28 and Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc.,2 9 the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the power to prescribe rules
of practice and procedure is vested exclusively in the judiciary. 30 The court in
McBride first began to develop the formalist proposition that the judiciary possessed
exclusive rule-making authority. 131 In McBride, the New Mexico Attorney General
filed a quo warranto 132 to challenge the constitutionality of the appointment of
McBride to a judicial seat.133 The primary issue was whether the quo warranto was
122. See Roy, 40 N.M. at 422, 60 P.2d at 661.
123. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 226-27. The court's decision in Roy to hold that the
power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure is an inherent power of the judiciary was one of many instances
in which the judiciary enhanced its independence in New Mexico. Id. at 234. In fact, the holding in Roy was later
seen on a broader scale in the Model Judicial Article, written by the American Bar Association between 1959 and
1962. The Model Judicial Article served to vest "extensive rle-making power in the judiciary." Id. at 229.
Montgomery, however, took issue with the Model Judicial Article because, in the name of enhancing the judiciary's
independence, the American Bar Association simultaneously expanded the power of the judiciary and thus
implicated separation of powers issues. Id. at 254.
124. See Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988); State ex. reL Att'y General
v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981); In re Motion for a Subpeona Duces Tecum, 94 N.M.
1, 606 P.2d 539 (1980); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); State ex rel.
Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947); Rupp
v. Hurley, 2002-NMCA-023, 41 P.3d 914; State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978); Gonzales
v. Atnip, 102 N.M. 194, 692 P.2d 1343 (Ct. App. 1984).
125. See Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311,551 P.2d at 1358.
126. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
128. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
129. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
130. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 437; see also Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at
254. Both McBride and Ammerman are illustrative of the influence the Model Judicial Articles may have on the
New Mexico Supreme Court with its decision to hold that the right to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
is vested exclusively in the legislature. See Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 254.
131. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 437.
132. 88 N.M. 244, 247,539 P.2d 1006, 1009 (stating that a quo warranto is to "'ascertain whether [the public
officer] is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in or exercise any functions of the office to
which he lays claim"' (quoting Holloman v. Lieb, 17 N.M. 270, 273, 125 P. 601, 602 (1912))).
133. 88 N.M. at 245, 539 P.2d at 1007. The governor appointed Judge McBride to the judiciary after he was
reelected to the New Mexico Senate. Id.; see N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (restricting the appointment of members
of the legislature to civil offices).
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statutory or procedural in nature.' 34 The court in McBride found the quo warranto
to be procedural and emphasized that "the legislature lacks the power to prescribe
by statute rules of practice and procedure [such as a quo warranto]. Certainly
statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts cannot be made
binding, for the constitutional power is vested exclusively in this court."'35
At first glance, this conclusion appears formalistic; a power prescribed to one
branch cannot be exercised simultaneously by another. 36 Despite the statement that
the power is vested exclusively in the judiciary, the court in McBride tempered its
conclusion by stating that it had "'no quarrel with the statutory arrangements which
seem reasonable and workable."" 137 Thus, the court melded formalism with
functionalism to assert its exclusive constitutional authority to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure and, at the same time, its willingness to accommodate
legislative participation.'
The supreme court was less conciliatory, however, in Ammerman, a case in which
the court categorically denied the legislature the right to create a rule affecting the
practice and procedure of the court. 13 9 In Ammerman, the defendants were news
journalists who appealed a district court order compelling them to disclose the
names of their news sources. 1"° They asserted that a New Mexico statute protected
the information as privileged. 14' The court disagreed and held the statute to be
constitutionally invalid.
42
Relying on a number of cases, 143 the court articulated a bright-line rule:
"Under the Constitution, the legislature lacks the power to prescribe by statute
rules of practice and procedure, although it has in the past attempted to do so.
Certainly statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts
cannot be made binding, for the constitutional power is vested exclusively in this
court."'
144
The court's assertion is significant in that the court categorically denied the
legislature any authority to enact rules affecting practice and procedure. " 5 The court
relied specifically on the New Mexico Constitution.' 46 According to the supreme
134. McBride, 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008 (noting that if the quo warranto was statutory, the court did
not have jurisdiction over the matter).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See id.
137. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973)).
138. See id.
139. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
140. Id. at 308, 551 P.2d at 1355. Five consolidated cases were on appeal in which the defendants were sued
by the plaintiff for slanderous news broadcasts. Id. at 308, 551 P.2d at 1354.
141. Id. at 308, 551 P.2d at 1355. The statute provides that, "[u]nless disclosure be essential to prevent
injustice, no journalist or newscaster.. shall be required to disclose before any proceeding or authority.. .the source
of any published or unpublished information." NMSA 1953, § 20-1-12.1 (1969).
142. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359.
143. McBride, 88 N.M. 244,539 P.2d 1006; Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973); Sitta
v. Zin, 77 N.M. 146, 420 P.2d 131 (1966); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947); City of Roswell v.
Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d 701 (1939); State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
144. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311,551 P.2d at 1358 (emphasis added) (quotingMcBride, 88 N.M. at 246,539
P.2d at 1008).
145. Id. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1358-59.
146. Id. at 311-13, 551 P.2d at 1358-59.
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court, its power under article III, section 1, and its superintending power over all
inferior courts under article VI, section 3, "carries with it the inherent power to
regulate all pleading, practice and procedure.' ' 147 The court in Ammerman held that
to allow the legislature simultaneously to exercise such authority would undermine
the integrity and independence of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of
government. 1
48
The court in Ammerman then examined whether the statutory privilege asserted
by the defendants conflicted with any court rule. 49 Citing to New Mexico Rule of
Evidence 11-50 1,15' the court held the statute to be unconstitutional because rule 11-
501 enumerates that "no person has a privilege to refuse to disclose information,
except as provided by constitution or rule of the New Mexico supreme court
[sic]."'' Accordingly, the statutory privilege was void.'52
Although the rationale in Ammerman may be interpreted to be predominately
formalistic, there are also functional elements.153 On the surface, Ammerman stands
for the formal proposition that the legislature lacks any rule-making power since the
court held that this power is vested exclusively in the court. 154 Alternatively, the case
may be interpreted more pragmatically to suggest that the legislature may enact rules
affecting practice and procedure until the supreme court exercises "its inherent and
superseding power to revoke or amend the statutory provisions."'' 5 5 The court's
decision in Ammerman to evaluate whether the statute conflicted with a court rule
illustrates that the court was willing to look at other factors to ascertain when the
legislature may act, although it affirmatively denied this branch the authority to
supersede the court's own rules. 156 Ammerman is ultimately symbolic of the
difficulty the supreme court historically has had in properly defining the scope of
the judiciary's inherent power over practice and procedure."' The court has been
caught between two competing strains: judicial exclusivity and judicial supremacy
over such rules. 58 The issue is extraordinarily complex because it affects a
fundamental value underlying separation of powers: the judiciary's ability to
maintain its independence and integrity as a co-equal branch of government. 59
Despite any ambiguities in the opinion, Ammerman signaled that the court was
intent on analyzing this issue in a more formalistic manner.' 6° The court relied on
constitutional provisions, 16 ' abided by the bright-line rule articulated in rule 11-501,
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1359 (noting that prior cases declined to assert that the court's rule-making power
was exclusive because there was no conflict between a law promulgated by the court and a statute).
150. Rule 11-501 NMRA.
151. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358.
152. Id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358. The supreme court later enacted a news media confidential source privilege
that mirrored the statute invalidated in Ammerman. Rule 11-514 NMRA.
153. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 443.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311-12, 551 P.2d at 1358-59.
157. See supra Part B.C.
158. See supra Part IB.C.
159. See supra Part n.C.
160. See Ammerman, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354.
161. See N.M. CONST. arts. IH, § 1, VI, § 3.
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and acknowledged the clear delineation of power between the legislature and the
judiciary in holding that the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure is
vested exclusively in the supreme court. 6 2 The importance of judicial exclusivity
for the court in Ammerman outweighed any functional desire to defer to legislative
prerogative because the testimonial privilege at issue, as a rule of procedure, touched
upon a core function of the judicial branch. 163
Despite the bright-line rule posited inAmmerman"6 and McBride,'65 New Mexico
courts continued to shift between formalism and functionalism in analyzing whether
the legislature may enact a rule of practice or procedure. 66 When a statute
encroached on an "essential function" of the court or involved a "testimonial
privilege," the court tended to defer to the formal rule of Ammerman.167 In more
ambiguous cases, however, New Mexico courts have construed Ammerman
narrowly, allowing for instances in which exceptions to the rule can be made.
68
Consequently, New Mexico courts analyze the supreme court's scope of power to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure with an eye toward both functionalism
and formalism, depending on the type of issue presented to the court.
169
An example of a New Mexico court balancing out the formalism posited in
Ammerman may be seen in State v. Herrera.70 The holding in Herrera, arguably the
theoretical antithesis of Ammerman, reflects the judicial desire to resolve the issue
of whether the legislature may enact rules of practice and procedure practically and
with greater deference to legislative decision making.'7 ' The appellate court in
Herrera upheld a statute that limited the discovery and cross-examination of a
162. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 443.
163. See Ammerman, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354.
164. Id.
165. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
166. See State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (1978); Ammerman, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1358;
McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006; see also, Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 253-54.
Montgomery criticized Ammerman and McBride on the grounds that the court "read too much into the separation-of-
powers principle. The constitutional mandate of separate powers does not assign particular powers.. .but merely
prohibits each branch from assuming powers 'properly belonging' to another." Id. at 254. In essence, the
constitution does not prescribe the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure to either the judiciary or
the legislature, so for the judiciary to determine it has exclusive control is too far reaching, for "the validity of
acts.. is to be measured 'solely by the yardstick of the constitution."' Id. at 255 (quoting State ex rel. Clark v.
Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 570, 904 P.2d 11, 19 (1995)).
167. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 449, 457. Both "essential function" and "testimonial privilege"
cases trigger a formal application of the rule because the legislature is deemed to have encroached upon or
aggrandized the power of the judiciary. Id. at 449, 457; see State ex rel. Att'y General v. First Judicial Dist. Court,
96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981). The court held the public interest privilege and federal confidentiality privilege
asserted by the New Mexico Attorney General to be unconstitutional because neither was enumerated in the New
Mexico Constitution or New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-501. The court did, however, recognize the executive
privilege asserted by the Attorney General because it was specified in the constitution. The court's rationale was
purely formalistic, as evidenced by its textual interpretation of rule 11-501 and its determination that rules of
evidence are integral to the effective functioning of the court as an independent branch of government. Id. at 237,
629 P.2d at 333; see also Maestas v. Allen, 97 N.M. 230, 231, 638 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1982) (stating that if the
legislature enacts an "evidentiary privilege, the statute must fall because it is in conflict with New Mexico's Rules
of Evidence").
168. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 447; see also State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 12,582 P.2d 384, 389
(Ct. App. 1978).
169. See Herrera, 92 N.M. at 11-12, 582 P.2d at 388-89.
170. 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384.
171. Seeid. at I5, 582 P.2d at 392.
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victim's past sexual history.," Although the court recognized the assertion posited
in Ammerman that the power to enact rules of practice and procedure is an exclusive
power of the judiciary, the court in Herrera asserted a functional rationale to
conclude that the real issue was whether the statute conflicted with a rule of the
Court. 
1 73
Herrera interpreted the bright-line rule in Ammerman not to preclude the
legislature from enacting such statutes but only to ensure judicial supremacy when
determining the statute's validity.17 Rather than categorically prohibiting the
legislature from enacting such statutes, the court made the functional determination
that the "court has no quarrel with the statutory arrangements which seem
reasonable and workable."' 175
Following Herrera, the argument over the scope of the supreme court's authority
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure continued to surface, resonating the
tension between the formal-judicial exclusivity and the functional-judicial
supremacy approaches.176 This contentious theoretical debate recently divided the
court in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer.177
Ill. DISCOVERY DISPUTE TO THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer arose from a discovery dispute in
the criminal prosecution of Marco Antonio Brizuela, who was accused of criminal
sexual penetration.78 After the alleged rape, the victim went to the Albuquerque
Rape Crisis Center (ARCC) and met with the center's counselors. 79 Brizuela filed
a motion to compel the ARCC to take part in the pretrial interviews with the defense
and to provide the defense access to any communications the center personnel had
with the alleged victim. 80
The ARCC entered a special appearance in district court and asserted that its
communications with the alleged victim were protected under the victim-counselor
privilege set forth in the Victim Counselor Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality
Act).' 8' The district court rejected the ARCC's argument because it considered itself
172. Id. at 11, 582 P.2d at 388.
173. Id. at 12, 582 P.2d at 389.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., State ex rel. Att'y General v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 94 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981).
Contra Sw. Cmty. Heath Sen's. v. Harrell, 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988).
177. 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820.
178. Id. 2, 120 P.3d at 821.
179. Id.
180. Id. (stating that the defendant sought to compel the "ARCC counselors to participate in pretrial
interviews with defense counsel and to provide statements concerning their contact with the alleged victim" (internal
quotations omitted)).
181. Id.; see NMSA 1978, §§ 31-25-1 to -6 (1987). The act states:
A victim, a victim counselor without the consent of the victim or a minor or incapacitated victim
without the consent of a custodial guardian or a guardian ad litem appointed upon application
of either party shall not be compelled to provide testimony or to produce records concerning
confidential communications for any purpose in any criminal action or other judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding... .A victim counselor or a victim shall not be compelled to provide
testimony in any civil or criminal proceeding that would identify the name, address, location or
telephone number of a safe house, abuse shelter or other facility that provided temporary
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bound by New Mexico Supreme Court Rule of Evidence 11-501.182 Rule 11-501
states that no person may assert a privilege unless so required by the constitution or
supreme court rule, and, thus, the district court did not recognize the statutory
privilege. 18 3 The ARCC then filed petitions with the New Mexico Supreme Court
to review the district court's order."8
The supreme court, in an opinion authored by Justice Chavez, reversed the trial
court's order and determined that the Confidentiality Act created a valid evidentiary
privilege. 85 The majority, in a four to one vote, articulated that, while a statutory
privilege such as the victim-counselor privilege was not binding on the court, the
statute would be recognized if it were consistent with a court rule, thus exercising
judicial supremacy over rules of practice and procedure.8 6
Chief Justice Bosson, writing in the dissent, took issue with the majority's
decision 187 and asserted the victim-counselor privilege to be unconstitutional. 88 The
dissent's analysis rested on the assertion that New Mexico case law states
unequivocally that the legislature does not have the authority to create a rule of
practice and procedure, such as an evidentiary privilege, because the power to do so
is vested exclusively in the supreme court. 18 9 The decision to create an evidentiary
privilege, according to the dissent, is a "core function of the judiciary as a separate
and equal branch of government" and, therefore, cannot be exercised simultaneously
by the legislature.'90
IV. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE MAJORITY'S AND DISSENT'S
RATIONALE IN BLACKMER
The majority and dissent in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer
diverged in their opinions of whether the legislature may enact an evidentiary
privilege because they employed a different theoretical approach.' 9' The court in
Blackmer faced the contention that State v. Roy'9 declined to answer, one that
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. 193 answered in the affirmative and that
emergency shelter to the victim of the offense or occurrence that is the subject of a judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding unless the facility is a party to the proceeding.
Id. § 31-25-3.
182. Rule 11-501 NMRA.
183. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 1 2, 120 P.3d at 821 (agreeing to Brizuela's motion to compel production
of the motion).
184. Id. 4, 120 P.3d at 821 ("ARCC filed a Petition for Emergency Writ of Prohibition or Alternatively for
Writ of Superintending Control and Request for Stay of Order.").
185. Id. 1 1, 120 P.3d at 821.
186. Id. (finding that the victim privilege was consistent with the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege enumerated in Rule 11-504 NMRA).
187. Id. 23, 120 P.3d at 827. (Bosson, C.J., dissenting) ("With reluctance, I respectfully dissent. In my mind,
the majority opinion is wrong on the law, wrong on policy, and grossly unfair to this criminal Defendant.").
188. Id. 128, 120 P.3d at 828.
189. Id. 25, 120 P.3d at 827.
190. Id. 24, 120 P.3d at 827 (citing Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354
(1976)).
191. Id.
192. 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
193. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
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State v. Herrera'94 pragmatically qualified: whether the authority to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure is vested exclusively within the supreme court. 95
The majority in Blackmer employed a functionalist argument to uphold the
validity of the Confidentiality Act by adopting an exception to the Ammerman rule,
evoking policy arguments, and deferring to the legislature's right to pass such
statutes.'96 The dissent, however, adhered to a formalistic analysis relying on the
bright-line rule of Ammerman and a strict reading of New Mexico Rule of Evidence
11-501 to assert that the legislature overstepped its constitutional boundaries by
passing the Confidentiality Act. 197 The friction between the majority and the dissent
symbolizes the doctrinal strain between formalism and functionalism in New
Mexico, with respect to interpreting the scope of the judiciary's power to enact rules
of practice and procedure: the conflict between judicial supremacy and judicial
exclusivity. 98
A. The Majority and Functionalism
The majority employed a functionalist rationale to uphold the Confidentiality
Act. 9 Rather than subscribing to the bright-line rule that the power to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure is vested exclusively in the court, it applied a
practical framework to allow the legislature to share this authority with the
judiciary. 2°° The majority ultimately relied on a workable and pragmatic interpreta-
tion of article I, section 3201 and article I, section 1202 of the New Mexico
Constitution, New Mexico case law, and policy arguments. 23
The majority quickly rejected the argument that the authority to form rules of
practice and procedure is vested exclusively in the supreme court.2' To support this,
the majority reasoned that New Mexico case law did not intend to "exclude the
legislature from the rule-making process but only intended to assure judicial
supremacy in any clash between legislative and judicial rules of procedure." 205 This
assertion immediately placed the majority's analysis in a functionalist framework
because it allowed thejudiciary to accommodate legislative action and only preclude
such action in situations where the legislature threatened to encroach upon an
inherent power of the judiciary.20 6 The majority, by rejecting the contention that the
194. 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (1978).
195. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 1 5, 120 P.3d 820, 821-22.
196. Id. E 1-22, 120 P.3d at 821-27.
197. Id. -H 23-39, 120 P.3d at 827-30 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., id. W 23-39, 120 P.3d at 827-30.
199. See id. 15, 120 P.3d at 822 (majority).
200. See id.
201. N.M. CONST. art. , § 3.
202. N.M. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
203. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 91 19, 120 P.3d at 826-27.
204. Id. 15, 120 P.3d at 822.
205. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 437).
206. See id. The majority took note of the fact that the court and the legislature historically had shared this
power at times. Id. To shift that power exclusively to the judiciary was deemed unnecessary by the majority and
perhaps would create an imbalance between the judicial and legislative branch. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1527
(stating that "[tihe sharing of powers, in itself is not repugnant to the functionalist, nor is the formation of alliances
among the branches repugnant, as long as the basic principles of separated powers are not impaired"); Montgomery
& Montgomery, supra note 15, at 254 (stating that "to shift a power traditionally exercised" by one branch to the
other "is to alter the balance of powers"); Tanielian, supra note 6, at 967.
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authority vests solely in the judiciary, removed the court from the formalistic
judicial exclusivity rationale articulated in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc. without overruling it outright. °7
To buttress its argument that the legislature may share in this authority, the
majority cited to article VI, section 1,208 of the New Mexico Constitution, asserting
that the court may exercise its superintending control if a statute conflicts with a rule
of the court.2' The majority's assertion served to enhance the scope of the
judiciary's power since superintending control typically is defined as the supreme
court's power to regulate lower courts, not the court's supremacy in determining the
validity of statutes.21° Regardless, judicial supremacy over rules of practice and
procedure allowed for the power to be shared simultaneously between the two
branches. Therefore, the focus of the majority's analysis was whether the legislature
interfered with a core function of the supreme court.21" '
The majority in Blackmer acknowledged instances in which the court previously
allowed the legislature to enact rules of practice and procedure.212 Despite the
conclusions in Ammerman213 and its progeny, the majority insisted that none of these
cases "categorically prohibited the Legislature from enacting legislation affecting
practice and procedure. ' 2 4 Instead, the majority inferred that the legislature was
only precluded from promulgating a statute in certain cases, such as Ammerman,
because the statute at issue conflicted with a rule of the court.2 5 As a result, the
majority promoted a great deal of flexibility between the court and the legislature
to enact rules, so long as the legislature did not encroach upon the essential
functions of the judiciary. 216
The majority laid out a three-part analysis for courts to employ when faced with
legislation affecting court practice and procedure and, specific to the Confidentiality
Act, a testimonial privilege.21 7 First, the court held that the legislature may not enact
a privilege not recognized or required either by the New Mexico Constitution or
court rule because to do so would conflict with New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-
207. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 5-6, 120 P.3d at 822 (stating that the holding of Ammerman was actually
narrow due to the specific facts of the case). Ammerman is factually very similar to Blackmer because both involved
a statutory testimonial privilege. The majority, unlike Ammerman, did not view that it was necessary to vest the
power to prescribe testimonial privileges exclusively within the judiciary if the supreme court could have the final
word. Thus, judicial supremacy was enough to protect the judicial branch from any threat of encroachment by the
legislature.
208. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
209. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 5, 120 P.3d at 822.
210. See State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397,420, 60 P.2d 646, 660 (1936); Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note
15, at 255 (stating that the power of superintending authority is limited in scope and applies only to the "judiciary's
internal operations rather than its external relations with other branches of government").
211. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1527 (citing State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978)).
212. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 12, 120 P.3d at 823.
213. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354(1976).
214. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 9, 551 P.3d at 823.
215. Id. ( 6-10, 120 P.3d at 822-23. The issue of conflict triggered judicial supremacy because the court
in Ammerman viewed the statute at issue specifically to encroach upon the court's inherent authority to regulate
practice and procedure and thus jeopardized independence. Id.
216. See Strauss, supra note 47, at 489 (stating that functionalism "stresses core function and relationship,
and permits a good deal of flexibility when these [separation of powers] attributes are not threatened"); see also
Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973).
217. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 11, 120 P.3d at 824.
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501.218 Second, the court noted that if the legislature creates a privilege that "affects
arguably the same subject matter" as a privilege enumerated in rule 11-501, the
court will determine whether the statutory privilege is consistent with the rule.2 19
Third, the court stated that if the statutory privilege is consistent with rule 11-501,
then the court will give it effect.22° Conversely, the court indicated that, if the statute
is not consistent, then the court rule prevails.22' The result of this three-part test
promotes judicial supremacy with respect to rules affecting court practice and
procedure, greater collaboration between the judiciary and the legislature in New
Mexico, and allows for both branches to respond to contemporary needs of
222
society.
The majority applied this functional framework to the victim-counselor privilege
and gave it effect because the majority deemed it to be consistent with New Mexico
Rule of Evidence 11-504, a rule affording a psychotherapist-patient privilege.223 The
majority analogized the victim-counselor privilege enumerated in the Confidentiality
Act to the psychotherapist-patient privilege because both serve to protect
confidential communications and are justified by similar private and public
concerns. 224 Additionally, the majority emphasized the dual policy concerns behind
the statutory privilege and the rule 11-504 privilege225 and provided an exhaustive
list of how the Confidentiality Act will further the private rights of the victims it
seeks to protect and public interests as a whole.226 In summation, the majority upheld
the victim-counselor privilege because it worked in harmony with a court rule, was
grounded in sound public policy, and did not pose a danger of unduly encroaching
upon the power of the court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.227
B. The Dissent and Formalism
Chief Justice Bosson, writing in dissent, employed a formalistic rationale to
critique the majority's decision. 8 He premised his argument on the plain language
of both Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. and rule 11-501 .229 According to
Chief Justice Bosson's rationale, Ammerman and rule 11-501 conclusively preclude
218. Id.; see Rule 11-501 NMRA (stating that, "[e]xcept as otherwise required by constitution, and except
as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by the supreme court, no person has a privilege to.. refuse to
disclose any matter").
219. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 11!, 120 P.3d at 824.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Tanielian, supra note 6, at 986.
223. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 13, 120 P.3d at 824; see Rule 11-504 NMRA (enumerating the
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
224. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 14, 120 P.3d at 825.
225. Rule 11-504 NMRA.
226. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 15-17, 120 P.3d at 825-26. The court stated that rape crisis centers
provide specialized services for victims and are unique places of refuge and support for victims. In order for the rape
crisis center to function effectively, the court deemed it essential that the victim be able to confide with complete
confidentiality, for the privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust." Id. 9115, 120 P.3d at
825 (internal quotations omitted). The guarantee of confidentiality would encourage the reporting of such crimes,
thus enabling the police to prevent further crimes of sexual assault. Id. 919 15-17, 120 P.3d at 825-26.
227. Id. 9117, 120 P.3d at 826 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
228. Id. 9123, 120 P.3d at 827.
229. Id. 924-25, 120 P.3d at 827.
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the legislature from creating an evidentiary privilege.230 As a result, any statute that
constituted a rule of practice or procedure (and in this case an evidentiary privilege)
is "an unconstitutional incursion upon the doctrine of separation of powers.""23
Unlike the majority, Chief Justice Bosson expressly articulated that the issue was
based on an understanding of the separation of powers doctrine.232 He noted that it
is the supreme court, not the legislature, that has the constitutional authority to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure.233 The power to effectuate an
evidentiary privilege, therefore, "remains a core function of the judiciary as a
separate and equal branch of the government.",23' Chief Justice Bosson criticized the
majority's decision to disregard the clear language set forth in Ammerman and rule
11-501 because to do so invited the legislature to invade the province of the
judiciary.235 Chief Justice Bosson reasoned that the consequence of the majority's
holding melded the legislature with the judiciary and encouraged the legislature to
control, either directly or indirectly, rules of practice and procedure.236
Chief Justice Bosson focused on the court's use of the word "exclusive" in
Ammerman.237 Chief Justice Bosson emphasized that a constitutional power vested
exclusively in one branch cannot reside simultaneously within two distinct and
separate branches.238 He reasoned that the court in Ammerman held the statutory
privilege to be unconstitutional not because the court found it to be inconsistent with
a court rule, but because the legislature had overstepped its constitutional
boundaries.239 Consequently, Chief Justice Bosson relied on Ammerman not only to
assert that the power to enact an evidentiary privilege is vested exclusively within
the court, but also to affirm that the power could not, in any situation, be shared
between the two branches.24
Chief Justice Bosson also focused on the plain language of rule 11-501, which
enumerated that no person may assert a privilege unless it is recognized by court
rule or the New Mexico Constitution.2 1 As a result, he concluded that the majority's
230. Id.; see Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976) (asserting that the
power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure is vested exclusively in the judiciary); Rule 11-501 NMRA
(stating that no person may assert a privilege not recognized by court rule or enumerated in the constitution).
231. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 26, 120 P.3d at 828 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Id.; see N.M. CoNsT. arts. 1a § 1, VI, § 1. Contra Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 254.
234. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, I 24, 120 P.3d at 827 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting); see Montgomery &
Montgomery, supra note 15, at 231, 254. Chief Justice Bosson's reasoning echoed that of Justice Carmody in 1963
when Justice Carmody criticized Judge Donnelly's proposal to the New Mexico Constitutional Revision
Commission that appellate jurisdiction be provided by the legislature instead of by court rule. Justice Carmody
argued for the court's extensive regulation of practice and procedure, especially with respect to appellate
jurisdiction. Justice Carmody wrote that "the Court is in a much superior position to determine what may be
necessary" in regard to the judiciary's operations and that the "Judicial Branch should operate as one separate unit."
See Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 231 (quoting Letter from Justice David W. Carmody to Edward
E. Triviz & Ellis L Stout, supra note 110).
235. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 1 35, 120 P.3d at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
236. See id.
237. Id. 27, 120 P.3d at 828.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. See id. 34, 120 P.3d at 829. Although rule 11-501 is not enumerated in the constitution and is a creation
of the supreme court, Chief Justice Bosson still applied a formalistic analysis presumably because rule 11-501
serves as a reminder that the legislature may not enact a statutory privilege.
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
determination to allow the legislature to create a privilege when it is consistent with
a court rule negates the clear language of rule 11-501.242 Rule 11-501 comports with
the premise in Ammerman that the legislature cannot pass rules of practice and
procedure; the majority's functional interpretation of the plain reading of each,
according to Chief Justice Bosson, serves to undermine the independence of the
judicial branch.243 If the New Mexico Supreme Court does not have the exclusive
authority to piomulgate rules of practice and procedure, Chief Justice Bosson
reasoned, then "by what right can [the court] claim to be an equal and independent
branch of government?" 244 He emphasized that the very issue touched on core values
of the judiciary: "The decision to allow someone not to give testimony... goes to the
heart of judicial authority. Courts are all about seeking the truth, and towards that
end everyone, rich and poor, the most powerful and the most humble, can be
compelled to give testimony. ' 245 Consequently, Chief Justice Bosson determined
that, to preserve such values, judicial exclusivity over rules of practice and
procedure was essential. 246
Chief Justice Bosson stressed that the bright-line rules articulated in Ammerman
and rule 11-501 better serve the interests of the judiciary and the legislature.247 He
noted that bright-line rules foster predictability, transparency, and continuity in the
law because the division of authority between the court and the legislature is clearly
delineated. 248 He suggested that such a result would help litigants recognize that only
the court may create privileges, confirm for the legislature its constitutional
limitations, and affirm for the judiciary its independence as a co-equal branch of
government.249 In view of Chief Justice Bosson's rationale, the permissive rule
adopted by the majority would only encourage the legislature to act and,
consequently, provided no protection for the judiciary.250
The issue of the constitutionality of the Confidentiality Act and the statutory
privilege it created was simple for Chief Justice Bosson. His analysis was void of
policy arguments, creative interpretation of the law, or deference to legislative
242. Id. 1 30, 120 P.3d at 828.
243. See id. 134, 120 P.3d at 829.
244. See id. Contra Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 256. Montgomery argues that the notion
of inherent powers, as articulated in Ammerman, is now more restrained. Id. Arguably, if the supreme court and the
legislature have historically been able to share this authority without compromising the integrity of the judicial
branch, it is difficult to reason that the majority's decision will serve to undermine the court's independence. See
id. ("[A] court's use of inherent powers is justified when necessary to protect 'the court's ability to perform its
essential judicial functions' (quoting N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, 27. 986 P.2d
450,458) and "'to protect itself from indignities"' (quoting State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162, 315
P.2d 223, 227 (1995)).).
245. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 134, 120 P.3d. at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting). The majority addressed
this argument, noting that they were "mindful that adopting evidentiary privileges may increase the risk of
interfering with the truth-seeking process of litigation" and that "the public.. has a right to every man's evidence."
Id. 18, 120 P.3d at 826 (majority) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). The majority reasoned,
however, that judicial supremacy over the legislature with regard to rules of practice and procedure was sufficient
enough to protect judicial values.
246. Id. 34, 120 P.3d at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
247. See id. 35, 120 P.3d at 829.
248. See id.; see also Eskridge, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that "[flormalism might be understood as giving
priority to rule of law values such as transparency, predictability, and continuity in law").
249. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 35, 120 P.3d at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
250. See id.
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decision making because, for him, the issue rested on a formalistic theory of
separation of powers. 1 Chief Justice Bosson reiterated that the court in Ammerman
interpreted article I, section 3 and article VI, section 1 of the New Mexico Constitu-
tion to vest the authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure exclusively
in the supreme court.252 As a result, this power could not reside simultaneously with
the legislature.253
More specifically, Chief Justice Bosson interpreted rule 11-501 to reinforce the
bright line rule enumerated in Ammerman with respect to testimonial privileges.254
He emphasized that rule 11-501, by expressly precluding the legislature from
enacting a statutory privilege, advocated exclusive judicial control of the courts,
especially with respect to who may or may not give testimony. 55 Chief Justice
Bosson reasoned that the enactment and regulation of evidentiary privileges "goes
to the heart of judicial authority" because these privileges directly affect the truth
seeking process.256 Because the Chief Justice considered the core function of the
judiciary to be the pursuit of the truth, he concluded that to allow the legislature to
influence this process would effectively abrogate the independence and autonomy
of the judicial branch. 7
V. THE VIRTUE OF FUNCTIONALISM IN NEW MEXICO
Although the majority and dissent diverged regarding the constitutionality of the
Confidentiality Act, both opinions equally reflect New Mexico case law with respect
to the court's scope of power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. The
majority's reasoning appears consistent with the functionalist approach of Roy and
its progeny-that is, when the New Mexico Legislature enacts a rule of practice and
procedure that proves reasonable and workable, the court will defer to such
legislation. 258 This may be particularly true with respect to the victim-counselor
privilege, as the court has recognized it to be within the "domain of the legislature,
as the voice of the people, to make public policy.""2 9 The Confidentiality Act, in
part, was motivated by public policy in order to protect the rights of rape victims,
encourage victims to report sexual assault crimes, and preserve the efficacy of rape
crisis centers, which serve as "a unique and essential place of refuge for a rape
251. See id. 24, 120 P.3d at 827.
252. See id. 27, 120 P.3d at 828.
253. Id.
254. See id. 30, 120 P.3d at 828.
255. Id. 134, 120 P.3d at 829. Cf Strauss, supra note 47, at 508 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n.
v. Shor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). In Shor, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued
that the "important functions of Article Ill are too central to our constitutional scheme to risk their incremental
erosion." Shor, 478 U.S. at 861. Any "dilution of judicial power operates to impair the protections of Article 111
regardless of whether Congress acted with the 'good intention' of providing a more efficient dispute resolution
system or with the 'bad intention' of strengthening the Legislative Branch at the expense of the Judiciary. Id. at 866.
Thus, "it is necessary to endure the inconvenience of separated powers in order to 'secure liberty."' Id. at 865.
256. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 34, 120 P.3d at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
257. Id.
258. State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 12, 582 P.2d 384, 389 (Ct. App. 1978) (citing Alexander v. Delgado, 84
N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973)).
259. State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Stds. Comm'n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 13,73 P.3d 197,206 (Serna,
J., specially concurring); see Kimberly Parmer-Bannerman, Note, State ex rel. New Mexico Judicial Standards
Commission v. Espinosa: Can Judicial Integrity Survive Executive Control?, 34 N.M. L. REV. 489 (2004).
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victim. ' '26° Furthermore, the victim-counselor privilege advances the same public
and private concerns as the psychotherapist-patient privilege.261' The legislation is
workable in that it comports with a pre-existing rule of the court and is particularly
reasonable as it was enacted in response to fundamental policy concerns.262
The majority's determination to interpret Ammerman narrowly and focus on
whether the statute conflicted with rule 11-501 demonstrates the court's deference
to the legislature, its restraint in asserting the scope of its inherent power, and the
court's functional approach to the issue.263 Had the majority invalidated the
Confidentiality Act, the majority would have "frustrate[d] the popular will" because
the legislature passed the act in an effort to address the rights of sexual assault
victims. 264 By creating an exception to the Ammerman rule, without disposing of it
completely, the majority clung to its inherent authority to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure by attempting to maintain a balance of power between the judiciary
and the legislature. 265 The supreme court retains its essential power of review over
such statutes and the legislature may effectuate necessary public policy; thus, the
holding allows each branch to function independently and interdependently with
respect to one another.26
While Chief Justice Bosson faithfully adhered to Ammerman, his formalist
approach may "straightjacket the government's ability to respond to new needs in
creative ways, even if those ways pose no threat to whatever might be posited as the
basic purposes of the constitutional structure." '267 The supreme court's authority to
regulate rules of practice and procedure originated out of the court's willingness to
evaluate separation of powers issues pragmatically. New Mexico courts have often
argued that a functionalist approach be taken and that "[i]t is unrealistic.. .to assume
that the functions performed by the three branches do not-and should not-blend
and overlap." '268 The majority's advocacy for judicial supremacy, allowing the
legislature to share in the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, will
provide for greater flexibility and efficacy in the law.269 In addition, because the
260. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 17, 120 P.3d at 826.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 15, at 253 ("Concomitant with the courts' power of review,
then, is the importance of restraint if the courts are to succeed in maintaining a sound balance of power.").
264. See id. ("To review and invalidate an act of a co-equal government branch is surely among the most far-
reaching of judicial powers.").
265. See id. ("The courts' legitimacy is vulnerable to attack when their actions impede the efforts of the
government's political branches.").
266. Id. at 255-57 (discussing essential powers of the legislature and judiciary).
267. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1526.
268. Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 483, 882 P.2d 511, 524 (1994).
269. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). "[T]he constitution by no means contemplates total
separation of each of these three essential branches of Government... The men who met in Philadelphia.. .were
practical statesman who.. .saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another
would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Id.; see Brown, supra note
5, at 1525 ("'To insist upon the maintenance of an absolute separation merely for the sake of doctrinal purity could
severely hinder the quest for a workable government with no appreciable gain for the cause of liberty or
efficiency."' (quoting Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to
Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 668, 670 (1990))); see also Browde & Occhialino, supra note 86, at 411.
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supreme court still retains the power to review such legislative statutes, the court
preserves its integrity and autonomy.
270
For the sake of analytical clarity, it may have been advantageous for the majority
and dissent to have acknowledged the arguments of each other, thereby employing
both formalism and functionalism in their rationales. 27' The majority could have
chosen, as was suggested by the dissent, to overrule Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad-
casting, Inc. and amend rule 11-501 to allow the legislature to create evidentiary
privileges. 2 Additionally, the court, in order to retain its superintending authority
over testimonial statutes, could have asserted the authority to invalidate statutes that
it deems to be unreasonable or unworkable with a court rule.273 In this sense, the
majority could have provided a clear rule that the legislature may promulgate rules
of practice and procedure. Such clarity and concreteness would demonstrate that this
power may be shared between the two branches but would still reserve to the
supreme court superintending control over these core functions. 74 Since the Framers
did not argue for a "profound gulf between form and function," perhaps neither
should New Mexico.275 Government may be construed as "an amalgam of rule-
following-formalism ... and political efficacy-functionalism," both of which allow
for deference to separation of powers principles.276 In many instances, New Mexico
courts have acknowledged that the legislature shares this authority with the supreme
court.277 To allow the legislature to partake in prescribing rules affecting practice
and procedure with the provision that the supreme court will have the final word
allows both entities "to breathe and evolve in response to new times, new problems,
and new circumstances. 278
VI. CONCLUSION
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer illustrates that the debate between
formal-judicial exclusivity and functional-judicial supremacy with respect to the
promulgation of rules of practice and procedure is far from settled in New Mexico.
The majority prevailed in its functionalist approach, perhaps because the New
Mexico judiciary has demonstrated an ability and willingness to share the authority
to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. While each of the three governmental
branches must remain separate from the others in order to prevent one branch from
accumulating too much power, it is evident from New Mexico case law that the
supreme court can effectively and efficiently share the authority to create rules of
practice and procedure with the legislature. Although Blackmer signaled the court's
explicit departure from the assertion that this power is vested exclusively in the
supreme court, the majority's refusal to overrule Ammerman or amend rule 11-501
signifies that this issue is still open for debate. As a result, the tension between
270. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 1 11, 120 P.3d at 824.
271. See supra note 82.
272. Blackner, 2005-NMSC-032, N 32-33,120 P.3d at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
273. See State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d, 1006, 1008 (1975).
274. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 11, 120 P.3d at 824.
275. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 27-28.
276. Id. at 28.
277. See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978).
278. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 29.
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functionalism and formalism, with respect to the right to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure, will continue in New Mexico courts for the time being.
